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1. Speech, Pornography, and Silencing 
The free speech of men silences the free speech of women.  
It is the same social goal, just other people. (MacKinnon, 
1987b) 
It has become standard for feminist philosophers of language to analyze 
Catherine MacKinnon’s claim in terms of speech act theory.  Backed by the 
Austinian observation that speech can do things and the legal claim that 
pornography is speech, the claim is that the speech acts performed by means 
of pornography silence women.  This turns upon the notion of illocutionary 
silencing, or disablement.  It is not that the victims of illocutionary silencing 
cannot produce locutions; it is that they cannot achieve the normal 
illocutionary effects by means of those locutions.  Jennifer Hornsby, Rae 
Langton, and Mary McGowan have all offered analyses and defences of 
MacKinnon of this form (Langton (1993); Hornsby and Langton (1998); 
Hornsby (2001); McGowan (2003)).  Pornography, on these accounts, causes 
women to be illocutionarily silenced in the sexual domain—it prevents them 
from refusing sex or particular sexual acts and in general from expressing 
their sexual preferences and desires. 
These analyses of MacKinnon have three components—first, they give 
an analysis of illocutionary silencing in speech act terms; second, they argue 
that this analysis provides a reasonable interpretation of MacKinnon’s 
claims; and finally they argue that pornography, or at least some 
pornography, does indeed cause illocutionary silencing.1 In what follows I 
am interested only in understanding the notion of illocutionary silencing. 
 
2.  Some Illocutionary Failures 
Langton’s earliest paper on this topic gives four examples of illocutionary 
silencing outside of the sexual sphere, one from Davidson, and three based 
on various laws governing speech acts.  They are as follows: 
Imagine this: the actor is acting a scene in which there is 
supposed to be a fire.…It is his role to imitate as persuasively as he 
can a man who is trying to warn others of a fire.  ‘Fire!’ he screams.  
And perhaps he adds, at the behest of the author, ‘I mean it!  Look at 
the smoke,’ etc.  And now a real fire breaks out, and the actor tries 
vainly to warn the real audience.  ‘Fire!’ he screams.  ‘I mean it!  
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Look at the smoke!’ etc. (Davidson, 1984) 
Marriage.  To say ‘I do’ is, given the right circumstances, to 
marry, given that the felicity conditions of marriage are satisfied.  
Suppose now that both parties intending to marry are male.  They 
sincerely intend to marry.  The speaker uses the right locution.  The 
priest is no mere actor.  The ceremony is performed by the book.  
The speaker satisfies all the felicity conditions but one.  Something 
about who he is, and who his partner is, prevents him from satisfying 
one crucial felicity condition.  The act of marrying misfires.  The 
felicity conditions for marriage are such that two male participants 
cannot succeed.  The act of marriage is not speakable for 
homosexual couples.  The power to marry, an important right 
available to other citizens, is not available to them. (Langton, 1993) 
Voting.  A white South African makes marks on a piece of paper 
in a polling booth.  A black South African makes marks that look 
just the same, and in similar conditions.  Their intentions, we can 
imagine, are just the same.  But the former has succeeded in doing 
something significant.  He has voted.  The latter has not.  Something 
about who he is prevents him from satisfying a crucial felicity 
condition.  South African law prevents his utterance from counting 
as a vote: voting is not speakable for him.  He too lacks an important 
political power available to other citizens. (Langton, 1993) 
Divorce.  To utter the words ‘mutallaqa, mutallaqa, mutallaqa’ 
is to perform the illocutionary act of divorce in a country where 
Islamic law is in force, provided certain felicity conditions are met.  
Pronounced by a husband to his wife, it is an act of divorce.  Not so 
if it is pronounced by the wife to the husband.  No matter how hard 
she tries, a woman cannot succeed in divorcing her spouse by 
making that or any relevantly similar utterance.  Divorce of that kind 
is an act which is unspeakable for women. (Langton, 1993) 
Langton (1993) treats these four cases as on a par—she says, when 
discussing the case of the actor, that “something about the role he occupies 
prevents his utterance from counting as a warning,” echoing the comments 
concerning who the speaker is in the description of the other cases.  This is a 
mistake.  There are important differences between the first case and the other 
three. 
In the case of marriage, voting, and divorce there are relatively rigid 
fixed conventional procedures for performing the acts.  Often the procedures 
are codified in law.  These procedures specify who can marry, vote and 
divorce, how they must comport themselves during the procedure for it to 
count, and whether there must be other participants.  In each of the three 
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cases described we might say that the persons and circumstances are not 
appropriate for invoking the conventional procedure.  Or we might say that 
there is no convention for marrying two men, for a black South African 
voting, or for a wife to divorce her husband.  Austin (1975) himself notes 
that there is overlap between these two ways of going wrong, and that the 
decision of which to say is somewhat arbitrary in some cases.  But whichever 
we say, we will not say the same thing about the case of the actor. 
First of all there are not in general rigid fixed conventional procedures 
for warning someone.  I may warn you by yelling out ‗Fire!‘ or ‗Car!‘ or 
some other reference to the thing I am warning you about.  I may place a sign 
reading ‗Beware of the dog‘ on my house to warn you about my vicious 
attack poodle.  I may say ‗I should warn you that I am tired and may fall 
asleep during your paper.‘ I may in some instances simply wave my hands 
and point frantically, if for example I do not think you will hear my voice.  I 
may write a formal letter to a student which contains the sentence ‗If your 
GPA continues to be below 2.0 for another term you will placed on academic 
probation.‘ 
All these locutions are suitable for warning.  Some of them may well 
have warning as their default illocutionary purpose.  Many of them may be 
used for other illocutionary purposes as well.  None of them are part of a 
codified legal procedure. 
Secondly, the kind and degree of illocutionary disablement seems 
different.  In the actor case one can imagine that a sufficiently motivated 
actor could eventually get through to the audience.  He might repeat himself 
to the point where someone in the audience turned and took up the cry.  He 
might jump down into the audience.  Of course, as Davidson himself points 
out, all of these acts could be interpreted as part of the play.  There is nothing 
the actor can do to guarantee his audience recognizes his intention to warn 
them, but he may still succeed in doing so.  In this the actor is not in a 
different in kind position to any other speaker—one cannot in general 
guarantee that the audience will recognize one‘s communicative intention.  
Rather it is more difficult for him than it generally is. 
In contrast, the audience will not in general have any difficulty in 
recognizing the illocutionary intentions of the speakers in the other three 
examples.  The problem is not an extreme case of the normal possibility of 
failing to have your communicative intentions recognized.  Rather as noted 
above, the problem is that even if everyone recognizes the speakers‘ 
intentions they will still not succeed in marrying, voting, or divorcing.  There 
is literally nothing they can do to achieve these acts because the conventional 
procedure does not allow them too. 
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3.  Failures in the Sexual Context 
Langton (1993) offers two examples of illocutionary silencing in the context 
of sex, one of refusal, and one of protest. 
Refusal.  Consider the utterance ‘no.’ We all know how to do 
things with this word.  We use it, typically, to disagree, to refuse, or 
to prohibit.  In sexual contexts a woman sometimes uses it to refuse 
sex, to prohibit further sexual advances.  However in sexual contexts 
something odd happens.  Sometimes a woman uses sex to refuse sex, 
and it does not work.  ...Saying ‘no’ sometimes doesn’t work, but 
there are two ways in which it can fail to work.  Sometimes the 
woman’s hearer recognizes the action she performs...  Sometimes 
though there is the different phenomenon of illocutionary 
disablement.  Sometimes ‘no’ when spoken by a woman, does not 
count as an act of refusal.  The hearer fails to recognize the utterance 
as a refusal; uptake is not secured.  ...She is in the position of the 
actor in Davidson’s story, silenced as surely as the actor is silenced. 
The example of protest involves the book Ordeal by Linda Lovelace, which 
denounces the pornography industry and describes her experience as an 
unwilling participant.  This book, despite its intended function as an act of 
protest against both the industry and her own treatment, appears in 
catalogues of erotic materials.  Langton (1993) tells us: 
She intends to protest.  But her speech misfires.  Something 
about who she is, something about the role she occupies, 
prevents her from satisfying protest’s felicity conditions, at 
least here.  ...She too is in the plight of Davidson’s actor.  
Warning was unspeakable for him.  Protest is unspeakable 
for her.  What he tries to say comes out as ‘merely acted.’ 
What she tries to say comes out as pornography. 
Langton compares both these cases to the case of the actor, and I think that is 
the correct comparison, in that in neither case does there exist a rigid 
codified legalistic procedure for performing the relevant speech act, and in 
perhaps more importantly, that in both cases we can imagine the 
communicative goals in fact being met.  The oblivious audience for the 
woman’s refusals might come to recognize them as she continues to object, 
though of course he might not—he might instead continue to see them as 
simply ritual moves in a game much as the audience might continue to see 
the actor as acting.  And in the case of Ordeal, some of the audience has in 
fact recognized that it is a work of protest not pornography, and one can 
imagine that even someone who initially took it for pornography could come 
to see this as a mistake. 
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4.  Kinds of Silencing 
What the four original cases have in common is that the speaker does not 
achieve uptake from the audience.  When the actor yells ‗Fire!‘ the theatre 
goers do not recognize that he intends to warn them, and so do not accept 
that utterance as a warning.  When the two men attempt to marry in a 
community that allows only heterosexual marriage the audience may 
recognize their intent, but because there is no accepted procedure for two 
men to marry, they will not accept them as married.  Langton, along with 
Hornsby and McGowan, focus on this lack of uptake and define illocutionary 
silencing in terms of being prevented from obtaining uptake for your 
illocutionary acts.  On their analysis if you cannot achieve uptake for your 
intended illocutionary act you cannot perform it.  Both the actor attempting 
to warn the audience of a fire and the woman attempting to refuse sex fail to 
achieve uptake, and so on this analysis fail to warn and fail to refuse sex.  
Elsewhere others have argued, following Strawson (1964, p.  448), that 
uptake is not in general necessary for illocutionary success (Bird (2002); 
Jacobson (2001; 1995).  In addition, it seems contrary to normal intuition to 
say that the woman in Langton‘s example does not refuse sex.  If the actor 
and the woman are silenced their failure to achieve uptake is a symptom of 
this silencing, not its cause. 
Locutionary silencing itself falls into different classes.  I may silence you 
by preventing you from producing any locution at all, say by gagging you, or 
denying you access to writing materials.  Alternatively, I might silence you 
by playing loud music so that while you can produce a locution, your 
audience cannot hear it.  This distinction is not perfectly precise – are letters 
in which part of the material is blocked out more like the former or the latter 
case? – but there is a clear analogy in the illocutionary case.  The black 
South African prior to 1994 is denied access to a conventional procedure for 
voting.  The actor is not denied access to a conventional procedure for 
warning people.  However, it is hard for his audience to recognize that he is 
attempting to use that convention. 
How is the actor silenced?  There exists a set of conventions according to 
which the utterance of the words ‗Fire!  I mean it!  Look at the smoke!‘ 
counts as a procedure for warning hearers of a fire, and these are usual 
conventions.  On the other hand there is another convention on which the 
utterance of the words ‗Fire!  I mean it!  Look at the smoke!‘ by an actor on 
stage does not count as warning anyone, but instead counts as portraying a 
character.  This second convention is more salient, overriding in some sense.  
An important feature of the acting conventions, and of conventions of fiction 
in general, is that they both usurp and depend upon the normal conventions.  
The character portrayed by the actor is taken to be warning someone in the 
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play because the words spoken by the actor are according to the usual 
conventions a procedure for warning hearers of a fire.  There are various 
features of the context that make the acting convention salient for the 
audience—the fact that the actor is on a stage and they are in a theatre, the 
fact that they have paid money in order to see a play, the fact that the actor is 
known by them to be an actor by profession (as opposed to another theatre 
employee), etc. 
The difficulty faced by the actor is that he wishes to access one 
convention, but is drowned out by the other, much as I may be drowned out 
by loud music.  The difference is that it is his illocution which is not 
recognized, rather than his locution. 
 
5.  Second Order Conventions 
The homosexual couple wishing to marry, the black South African wishing 
to vote in 1993, and the woman in a country under Islamic law who wishes 
to divorce her husband are prevented from achieving those acts because of an 
absence of a suitable conventional procedure.  In contrast, the actor, the 
woman attempting to refuse sex, and Linda Lovelace writing Ordeal are 
frustrated by the fact that their locution is suitable for performing too many 
illocutions, and circumstances make their locutions more likely to be 
interpreted as portraying a character, as conforming to a sexual role, or as a 
certain kind of violent pornography.  As Davidson in his own discussion of 
the actor points out, there is no sign that can be added to the locution that 
will make it unambiguous.  The word ‘literally,’ for example, is itself often 
used non-literally, as when I say ‘The cockroach was literally as big as a cat.’ 
The communicative difficulty facing the actor is increased because the 
conventions of theatre depend upon other conventions—in order to portray a 
character as asserting I must produce a locution that would, under normal 
circumstances, count as asserting, and similarly for marrying, praying, 
questioning, etc….  I make as if to assert. 
Consider one of MacKinnon’s (1987a) descriptions of the kind of 
material she objects to: 
[Pornography] eroticises hierarchy, it sexualizes inequality.  
It makes dominance and submission into sex.  Inequality is 
its central dynamic; the illusion of freedom coming together 
with the reality of force is central to its working.  Perhaps 
because this is a bourgeois culture, the victim must look 
free, appear to be freely acting.  Choice is how she got there.  
Willing is what she is when she is being equal.  It seems 
equally important that then and there she actually be forced 
and that forcing be communicated on some level, even if 
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only through still photos of her in postures of receptivity and 
access, available for penetration.  Pornography in this view 
is a form of forced sex, a practice of sexual politics, an 
institution of gender inequality.  ...To the extent that gender 
is sexual, pornography is part of constituting the meaning of 
that sexuality.  ...Pornography is not imagery in some 
relation to a reality elsewhere constructed.  It is not a 
distortion, reflection, projection, expression, fantasy, 
representation, or symbol either.  It is a sexual reality. 
Central to MacKinnon’s reading of the material is the idea that the woman is 
portrayed as refusing, that conventional means of communicating that refusal 
be used, even though she is also portrayed as choosing to be there.  The 
description Langton gives of the woman who says ‘No’ and ‘Stop’ and so on, 
but is not seen as by her companion as refusing sex, can also be understood 
in this way.  Perhaps he takes her as conforming to a role, a sexual script on 
which women make as if to refuse, to be unwilling, a script on which ‘good 
girls say no.’  This script only makes sense because the locutions used are 
suitable for refusing, because participants make as if to say no, much as in 
the case of acting. 
Illocutionary silencing of the sort MacKinnon is best understood as 
discussing depends on the presence not only of multiple interpretations of a 
locution—arguably all locutions have this property—but on the salient one 
of those interpretations being a second-order one which depends on the other 
one for its functioning.  Unlike Langton’s cases of marriage, voting, and 
divorce, it does not depend on the absence of a suitable convention.  Like the 
case of being shouted down, it doesn’t completely prevent one from being 
heard, it just makes it very difficult. 
All of this leaves open the question of whether the kind of silencing 
described in Langton’s refusal example and MacKinnon’s text actually 
occurs, and whether pornography is correctly identified as a cause if in fact it 
does. 
 
Notes                                                     
1 As Daniel Jacobson (1995) points out, all of these analyses also rely on an unarticulated 
distinction between illocutionary acts one ought to be able to perform and ones that are 
optional.  For example, I cannot by means of any locution enact laws in the state of Idaho, but 
this does not constitute any morally or legally improper restriction on my speech rights. 
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